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PUBLICLY CHARGED: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF 
IMMIGRANT PUBLIC BENEFIT RESTRICTIONS 
CORI ALONSO-YODER † 
ABSTRACT 
Since the early days of the Trump Administration, reports of the Pres-
ident’s controversial and dramatic immigration policies have dominated 
the news. Yet, despite the intensity of this coverage, an immigration policy 
with far broader implications for millions of immigrants and their U.S.-
citizen family members has dodged the same media glare. By expanding 
the definition of who constitutes a “public charge” under immigration law, 
the Administration has begun a process to restrict legal immigration and 
chill the use of welfare benefits around the country. The doctrine of public 
charge exclusion developed from colonial times and has reemerged in 
Trump Administration policies as a means to curtail legal immigration 
through executive action. While other commentators have questioned the 
racial implications of welfare reform as they affect Black families, the dis-
criminatory animus behind efforts to kick immigrant families off the rolls 
has yet to be explored.  
Drawing on critical examinations of welfare reform that locate race-
conscious motivations in the figure of the “welfare queen,” the Article ex-
amines the rhetorical appeal of the “anchor baby.” By questioning the le-
gitimacy of these children’s birthright citizenship and their use of benefits, 
proponents of immigration restriction reveal that their exclusionary poli-
cies are motivated less by concerns of immigration or economic status and 
more by fears of racial difference. When viewed in the context of political 
and demographic historical trends, the public charge doctrine emerges as 
a facially neutral pretext for legal discrimination that must be left firmly 
in the past.  
“I'd much rather find out whether or not anchor babies are citizens be-
cause a lot of people don't think they are. We're going to test it out.”1 
- Donald Trump (August 9, 2015) 
  
 † Practitioner in Residence in the Immigrant Justice Clinic at American University Washing-
ton College of Law. I wish to thank Jayesh Rathod, Sameer Ashar, Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Laila Hlass, 
Claire Thomas, and Ernie Collette who offered substantive feedback on this Article at the 2018 NYU 
Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop. I would also like to recognize the research assistance of 
Dalal Hillou, JD Lefrere, and Katia Barron. Any errors are my own. 
 1. Reena Flores, Donald Trump: “Anchor Babies” Aren’t American Citizens, CBS NEWS 
(Aug. 19, 2015, 10:44 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-anchor-babies-arent-
american-citizens/. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early months of 2018, several media outlets reported on leaked 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) draft policies, designed to re-
strict immigration to the United States based on public benefit use.2 These 
drafts set out a series of policy changes that dramatically expanded the 
consequences for legal immigrants’ interactions with state, local, and fed-
eral social safety net programs.3 Unlike existing regulations that create 
penalties for immigrants’ personal use of certain public benefits, the draft 
regulations proposed denial of visa status based on the public benefit use 
of immigrants’ U.S.-citizen children. The proposal also expanded the 
number and kinds of programs that immigration officials can consider in 
deeming a noncitizen “likely to become a public charge.”4 The Migration 
Policy Institute estimated that the proposal could affect 9.2 million U.S.-
citizen children and increase the percentage of noncitizens subject to visa 
denial from the current 3% to a staggering 47%.5  
  
 2. Dara Lind, Exclusive: Trump’s Draft Plan to Punish Legal Immigrants for Sending US-
born Kids to Head Start, VOX (Feb. 8, 2018, 7:37 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/2/8/16993172/trump-regulation-immigrants-benefits-public-charge; Nick 
Miroff, Trump Proposal Would Penalize Immigrants Who Use Tax Credits and Other Benefits, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 28, 2018, 12:10 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-
proposal-would-penalize-immigrants-who-use-tax-credits-and-other-benefits/2018/03/28/4c6392e0-
2924-11e8-bc72-077aa4dab9ef_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8712a664c565.  
 3. Lind, supra note 2; Miroff, supra note 2. 
 4. Lind, supra note 2; Miroff, supra note 2. 
 5. JEANNE BATALOVA ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., CHILLING EFFECTS: THE EXPECTED 
PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AND ITS IMPACT ON LEGAL IMMIGRANT FAMILIES’ PUBLIC BENEFITS USE 1, 4 
(2018).  
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After months of leaks and modifications, the Administration finally 
issued its notice of proposed rulemaking with the official version of the 
proposed rule on October 10, 2018.6 In its request for public comment, 
DHS received over 266,000 comments on the proposal.7 In the end, some 
of the most problematic aspects of the earlier, leaked draft rule disappeared 
from the final proposal. Among these were proposed provisions penalizing 
immigrant parents for their children’s authorized use of education, health, 
and nutrition benefits. Though these provisions were not present in the 
final proposal, their inclusion in the earlier draft laid bare the Administra-
tion’s hostility toward immigrant families.   
Efforts to change the public charge rule reflect a natural progression 
of the Trump immigration policy platform. In comments submitted to the 
government regarding the proposed changes, the Catholic Legal Immigra-
tion Network situated the proposal in a timeline of the Trump Administra-
tion’s broader campaign against legal immigration and family unity.8 
Those actions included: the ban on entry for nationals of certain Muslim-
majority nations (the so-called Muslim ban); rescission of protections un-
der the programs for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS); historically high restrictions on the ad-
mission of refugees; and the Administration’s “zero tolerance” policy sep-
arating parents and children at the U.S. Southern Border.9  
In early 2017, a leaked Executive Order—similar in essence to the 
leaked DHS draft policies—outlined a policy titled: “Protecting Taxpayer 
Resources by Ensuring Immigration Laws Promote Accountability and 
Responsibility.”10 Dated just three days after President Trump’s inaugura-
tion, the leaked order coincided with a flurry of executive orders that the 
new Administration issued in its first week in office.11 While President 
Trump signed and promulgated other controversial orders on immigration, 
the draft order remained merely a leak. Regardless, the draft proposed a 
dramatic and expansive new approach to evaluating immigrant use of pub-
lic benefits, portending the October 2018 rulemaking. The draft order pro-
posed reporting on specific issues, including “the cost to American tax-
payers of providing means-tested public benefits . . . to households headed 
  
 6. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–14, 245, 248). 
 7. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 17, 2019, 3:59 PM 
ET), https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USCIS-2010-0012. 
 8. CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK INC., COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSED 
RULEMAKING: INADMISSIBILITY ON PUBLIC CHARGE GROUNDS (2018). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Abigail Hauslohner & Janell Ross, Trump Administration Circulates More Draft Immigra-




 11. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,767, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
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by illegal aliens” and “the problem of ‘birth tourism,’ whereby individuals 
travel for the purpose of giving birth in the United States.”12  
The focus on these two issues reveals a troubling preoccupation with 
the rights of first-generation Americans born to immigrant parents—chil-
dren that immigration hardliners derisively call “anchor babies.” Indeed, 
this draft order foreshadowed the Administration’s later moves to limit le-
gal, family-based immigration;13 to question birthright citizenship;14 and, 
most overtly, to penalize immigrants of limited economic means as ulti-
mately codified in the proposed rule on public charge.   
These are unsurprising implementations of President Trump’s nativ-
ist campaign rhetoric. As a private citizen and presidential candidate, 
Trump not only famously (and repeatedly) questioned the citizenship of 
his predecessor in office but also openly challenged the nationality of the 
U.S.-born children of immigrants. While many criticized Trump’s birther-
ism theories about President Obama, few questioned his rhetoric delegiti-
mizing birthright citizenship and millions of first-generation U.S. citizens. 
Similarly, neither the mainstream media nor lawmakers have paid much 
attention to now-President Trump’s policies on public benefits and the im-
pacts they would have on many immigrants (both documented and undoc-
umented) or their U.S.-citizen children.  
These proposed policies follow a familiar pattern in U.S. politics of 
invoking crude, race-based stereotypes to inform public debate and restrict 
public benefits use. Nineteenth century statutes, which limited migrations 
of poor people, and more recent efforts in the mid-1990s to expand the 
definition of public charge through welfare and immigration reform, laid 
the groundwork for the current Administration’s policies. When examined 
together, these immigration policies on public charge bear striking simi-
larities to the racist rhetoric that peaked in the '90s surrounding Black fam-
ilies’ use of public benefits. 
Despite the facial neutrality of Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the Welfare Act or PRWORA), 
many have criticized the Welfare Act’s reliance on a racially discrimina-
tory rhetoric. In particular, the figure of the “welfare queen” became a term 
of intense controversy as welfare reformers furthered the narrative of this 
  
 12. Memorandum from Andrew Bremberg, on a Draft of an Executive Order on Protecting 
Taxpayer Resources by Ensuring Our Immigration Laws Promote Accountability and Responsibility, 
to the President of the U.S., 4–5 (Jan. 23, 2017) (available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/docu-
ments/national/draft-executive-orders-on-immigration/2315/). 
 13. Brian Bennett, Trump Says Chain Migration Allows ‘Virtually Unlimited Numbers of Dis-
tant Relatives’, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018, 7:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-es-
sential-washington-updates-hold-trump-on-chain-migration-1517356312-htmlstory.html.  
 14. Julie Hischfeld Davis, President Wants to Use Executive Order to End Birthright Citizen-
ship, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/us/politics/trump-birthright-
citizenship.html. 
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racially charged image as the personification of a system run amok.15 
Many commentators have examined the evidence of racial bias permeating 
efforts to restrict welfare benefits.16 Yet, concurrent efforts to disqualify 
immigrants from welfare entitlements—as ultimately enshrined within the 
Welfare Act—have gone largely unexamined. 
This Article likens the rhetoric surrounding the “welfare queen” to 
what the Author proposes as its immigrant counterpart, the “anchor baby.” 
This comparison has been previously drawn in the area of political sci-
ence,17 but this Article is the first in legal scholarship to analyze these po-
tent stereotypes as conditions precedent to changes in law and policy 
against the perceived advances in legal rights achieved by Black and im-
migrant communities. While previous authors have argued that racially 
coded political rhetoric behind welfare legislation represents a racist back-
lash to the Civil Rights Act and greater societal inclusion of African Amer-
icans, this Article explores the context leading to exclusion of immigrant 
families within the push for welfare reform and other contemporaneous 
legislative campaigns.  
In particular, this Article explores how anti-immigrant legislation—
1994’s Proposition 187 in California and the federal Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)—framed the 
debate and attitudes around the deservedness of immigrants. By looking 
to a similar history of animus in the lead up to PRWORA’s enactment, the 
Author argues that efforts to penalize and exclude immigrant access to 
welfare represent a nativist reaction to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) of 1965, and the increasingly diverse American population it 
fostered. While arguing that racist and nativist sentiments and rhetoric 
formed the basis for efforts to curtail receipt of public benefits, this Article 
also explores how the nineteenth century concept of the public charge has 
provided cover to welfare critics and allowed restrictions to immigrant 
families to go largely unexamined and free of widespread critique.  
  
 15. See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS 
OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999); Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Min-
strels: Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS 
ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 323 (Toni Mor-
rison ed., 1992); KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING THE 
RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR (2001); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: 
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth 
Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive 
Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473, 476–78 (1995); Rosalee A. Clawson & Rakuya Trice, Poverty As We 
Know It: Media Portrayals of the Poor, 64 PUB. OP. Q. 53, 53–64 (2000); Rose Ernst, Localizing the 
“Welfare Queen” Ten Years Later: Race, Gender, Place, and Welfare Rights, 11 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 181, 183 (2008) (citing ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE 
WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA (2000)); Franklin D. Gilliam, The ‘Welfare Queen’ Ex-
periment, NIEMAN REP., Summer 1999, at 52); Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of 
Reform, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2013, 2013 (1994). 
 16. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 15, at 475–76.  
 17. See Carly Hayden Foster, Anchor Babies and Welfare Queens: An Essay on Political Rhet-
oric, Gendered Racism, and Marginalization, 5 WOMEN, GENDER, & FAMILIES OF COLOR 50, 51 
(2017).  
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Part I describes the historic development of public charge exclusion 
up to the appearance of the Welfare Act and IIRIRA in the mid-90s. Part 
I isolates a recurring pattern wherein the application of public charge ex-
clusion inevitably responds to surges in immigration trends. Part II applies 
this history to examine the demographic, racial, and political context from 
which the Welfare Act emerged. Part II expands the work of critical race 
scholars on “welfare-queen” rhetoric to examine the co-occurring nativist 
impulses present in the Welfare Act’s treatment of immigrants. Using this 
scholarship as a guide, welfare policy emerges as a majoritarian reaction 
to restrict minorities’ societal ascendancy. The tendency to question eligi-
bility for public benefits becomes a proxy for deciding who is rightfully 
“American.” Nowhere does this become more evident than in the debate 
around birthright citizenship and the legitimacy of the “anchor baby.” Part 
III applies the framework of the past to the current political moment and 
the calculated racism behind the immigration policies of the Trump Ad-
ministration. 
By localizing broader trends in immigration, and the political rhetoric 
that coincides with the expansion of public charge principles, the Article 
concludes that restrictions on public benefits ultimately have a greater re-
lationship to race and ethnicity than to immigration or economic status. 
Historically, divisive political rhetoric against African American and im-
migrant communities represents a reaction against perceived social ad-
vances in these groups. In the immigrant experience, increased represen-
tation caused by higher levels of immigration trigger anti-immigrant po-
litical discourse, followed by changes in legal policy to curb public benefit 
eligibility. Understanding this blueprint for exclusion in the present day—
with increasingly, overtly hostile rhetoric—allies and advocates can begin 
to subvert its power as a political tool. Movements can learn lessons from 
each other and interrupt formulaic and potent political attacks by compar-
ing the struggles for racial, economic, and immigrant justice. 
I.  POVERTY-BASED LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON IMMIGRATION 
A.  Immigrants and the “Public Charge” 
Efforts to exclude immigrants18 based on their indigence have existed 
since before the founding of the United States. Even during a time when 
any limitation on immigration to the United States was practical and not 
yet legally prescribed, early colonialists employed the British common law 
  
 18. In this Article, I interchangeably use the terms “immigrant,” “noncitizen,” and “foreign-
born” to refer to people who are not native-born, U.S. citizens. While immigration law collectively 
refers to these individuals as “aliens,” I am persuaded by the work of Kevin Johnson and other immi-
gration scholars that this term tends to dehumanize persons and promote the subjugation of their rights. 
See Kevin R. Johnson, Colloquium Proceedings: Panel One, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: 
The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 264–67, 
271–72 (1997). Thus, I employ that term only when making a direct quotation to other sources. 
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practice of banishment of the poor from their communities.19 In the nine-
teenth century, tensions surrounding the arrival of immigrants from Ire-
land led to public support for increased control of Irish settlement and fur-
ther institutionalized restrictions on the immigrant poor.20 The rise of na-
tivist political movements and the stereotype of the Irish pauper led states 
and other locales to expand and develop the earlier common law practice21 
of excluding and banishing the indigent.  
By the late nineteenth century, the federal government had codified 
this practice in the Immigration Act of 1882 (the Act).22 The Act provided 
for the exclusion23 from the United States, of “any convict, lunatic, idiot, 
or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming 
a public charge.”24 The federal adoption of the public charge ground of 
exclusion coincided with pitched anti-Chinese sentiment codified in the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 mere months before the passage of public 
charge exclusion.25 That law barred Chinese immigrants from becoming 
U.S. citizens or from legally immigrating to the United States and repre-
sented the race-conscious motivations behind early immigration re-
strictions.26 Later, the Immigration Act of 1903 extended the public charge 
determination to the deportation context, permitting removal of immi-
grants within two years of their arrival to the United States.27 Notably, this 
provision limited the public charge deportation grounds to “causes exist-
ing prior to landing”; thus, making the deportation ground essentially a 
failsafe on the “exclusion at entry” provision. With time, the public charge 
doctrine continued to develop with each iteration increasingly disfavoring 
immigrants. In 1907, the period for which an individual determined to be 
  
 19. See HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES AND THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 40 (2017). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 43 (discussing how British poor laws, and their practice of removing nonresidents 
from individual communities, constituted the first American efforts at a law of immigration control). 
 22. Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214; see also Ekiu v. United States, 
142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
 23. IIRIRA ushered in a number of profound changes in immigration law, a number of which I 
explore in this Article. One of the most fundamental changes was a shift in the overall framework for 
immigration enforcement. Prior to its passage, “exclusion” denoted the process by which noncitizens 
were denied entry into the U.S., while “deportation” defined the legal process for banishment from the 
U.S. for those already in the country. IIRIRA redefined that framework, converting exclusion into 
“inadmissibility” and deportation into “removal.” While the terms changed, the new classifications 
remained the same in essential form and function to the previous processes. Throughout this Article, 
I refer to each process by the term historically relevant to the period I reference.   
 24. Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214.  This was the first immigration 
statutory reference to “public charge” in federal immigration law.  The statute built on the preexisting 
state-based efforts to banish the poor and established the principles developed in the years to follow.  
Together, those principles constitute what I refer to as public charge doctrine.  In addition, I reference 
public charge law to refer to specific public charges statutes; and I refer to the public charge rule to 
describe a specific policy or regulation dealing with public charge.   
 25. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58–59. 
 26. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitu-
tional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 7 (1998). 
 27. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, ch. 1012, § 20, 32 Stat. 1213, 1218.  
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a public charge extended from two years to three years.28 This change al-
lowed officials more opportunity to detect and deport individuals on the 
grounds of being a public charge.  
Despite the trend toward stringency, public charge law remained 
largely untouched for decades and became particularly rare as a ground of 
deportation or exclusion in the latter half of the twentieth century.29 Be-
tween 1951 and 1984, public charge grounds accounted for only 0.6% of 
all people excluded from the United States and for a mere 0.06% of people 
deported between 1951 and 1980.30 Congress revived public charge law 
from near obsolescence in 1996 with two new pieces of federal legislation: 
the PRWORA and IIRIRA.31 
B.  Immigration and PRWORA 
The decline in public charge immigration enforcement in the second 
half of the twentieth century coincides with a general downturn in immi-
gration to the United States in those decades. By 1970 the overall foreign-
born population hit its lowest point in the twentieth century at a mere 4.7% 
of the total population.32 This was a marked decrease from the turn of the 
century when the total foreign-born population reached a peak of 14.7% 
in 191033—the beginning of a decade where public charge accounted for 
nearly 33% of all deportations and over 50% of all exclusions.34 These 
numbers suggest that public charge enforcement has a directly propor-
tional relationship to an increase in immigration. As immigration rates to 
the United States increase, the percentage of public charge exclusions and 
deportations also increase. By 1996 the immigrant population of the 
United States was again on the rise, having increased steadily from the 
1970s to account for 7.9% of the total population in 1990.35 By 2000 the 
immigrant population would jump to 11.1%.36 This increase in immigra-
tion coincided with a national political conversation on government wel-
fare and the use of public benefits. Many scholars have examined the way 
in which race and gender played into these public attitudes about social 
safety net programs and calls for reform.37  
  
 28. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, ch. 1134, § 20, 34 Stat. 898, 904–05.  
 29. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERV., 1996 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 173, A.1-1, A.1-11, A.1-13, A.1-
18, A.1-23–24 (1997). 
 30. Id. at 175, 183. 
 31. Id. at A1-23.  
 32. U.S. Immigration Population and Share Over Time, 1850-Present, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/immigrant-population-over-time 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (follow “Number of Share of Total U.S. Population, 1850–2017” hyperlink 
under “By the Numbers: Current and Historical Stats about Immigrants at U.S. & State Levels”).  
 33. Id. 
 34. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 175, 183.  
 35. U.S. Immigration Population and Share Over Time, 1850-Present, supra note 32.  
 36. Id. 
 37. See Joel F. Handler, “Constructing the Political Spectacle”: Interpretation of Entitlements, 
Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 935–36 (1990); 
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II. DECONSTRUCTING ENTITLEMENTS THROUGH POLITICAL RHETORIC 
AND LEGISLATION 
A.  Racism, PRWORA, and the “Welfare Queen” 
Many commentators have exposed how neoconservatives used dog-
whistle political appeals and thinly veiled racial stereotypes to shape social 
attitudes toward welfare target recipients of public benefits. A notorious 
political foil in these efforts was the “welfare queen.” A stand-in for the 
undeserving poor, the “welfare queen” came to symbolize the quintessen-
tial urban freeloader taking advantage of government largesse and tax-
payer dollars. Stories of Black mothers using government benefits to buy 
steaks and drive Cadillacs became political talking points and stoked white 
resentment to undermine federal welfare programs. Indeed, the racialized 
political rhetoric around welfare became so pervasive that civil rights ad-
vocate Marian Wright Edelman noted at the time how “[welfare has be-
come] a fourth generation code phrase, perhaps more powerful than bus-
ing, quotas, and Willie Horton.”38  
In 1990, UCLA Professor Joel F. Handler deconstructed the implica-
tions and assumptions by which political ideologies manipulate rhetoric 
around welfare.39 In a symposium examining the legacy of the 1970 land-
mark decision in Goldberg v. Kelly40 (in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
expressly recognized an individual’s right and property interest in the re-
ceipt of government entitlements),41 Handler argues that welfare policy is 
both expressive and symbolic, “defin[ing] values and confirm[ing] sta-
tus.”42 Because welfare policy is inherently concerned with societal status 
and values, Handler explains that line-drawing around policies of eligibil-
ity turn on, “[t]he distinction between the deserving and undeserving 
poor,” and that this distinction “is a moral issue that affirms the values of 
a dominant society by stigmatizing the outcasts.”43 The expression of these 
in-group and out-group values is advanced through symbolism and lan-
guage; “observers construct themselves by constructing Others.”44 Han-
dler’s theoretic framework for understanding welfare policy in the 1980s 
and 1990s as a process of expressing and regulating the values of the dom-
inant society against “the Other” is useful in understanding the success of 
“welfare-queen” rhetoric. By creating symbolic language to describe the 
undeserving Other, the politically dominant group came to understand this 
  
Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, 
Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1519, 1519–25 (1995); Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking 
“Welfare Dependency” From a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1966 (1993); Note, supra note 
15, at 2019. 
 38. White, supra note 37, at 1966 n.22 (quoting Marian Wright Edelman). 
 39. Handler, supra note 37 at 899–900. 
 40. Id. at 899. 
 41. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 42. Handler, supra note 37, at 926. 
 43. Id. at 926 n.111 (quoting MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE 
17 (1988)). 
 44. Id. 
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term to refer to Black mothers undeservedly receiving public assistance. 
This language was key to masking the reality that in 1991 the number of 
Black families receiving benefits roughly equaled the number of white 
families, despite the fact that the former were more likely to be living in 
poverty.45  
Scholars have suggested that these race-based tropes found their ori-
gins in backlash to the civil rights movement.46 Anthony Cook argued that 
the conservative political attack on welfare of the 1980s, which culminated 
in the mid-1990s with the Welfare Act, was a white, political reaction to 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.47 Cook suggested that revisions to political 
rhetoric and the rise of race-motivated, dog-whistle politics allowed neo-
conservatives to sublimate overtly racist policies into calls for limited gov-
ernment and welfare reform.48  
Perhaps the most prominent proponent of these calls was President 
Ronald Reagan. Reagan used the issue of welfare fraud and abuse through-
out his political career and garnered national attention to his pet project for 
policy reform in a 1976 presidential campaign rally: “In Chicago, they 
found a woman who holds the record’ . . . “[s]he used 80 names, 30 ad-
dresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, vet-
erans’ benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as 
welfare. Her tax-free cash income alone ha[d] been running $150,000 a 
year.’”49 Reagan lifted this anecdote from the criminal prosecution of a 
Black woman named Linda Taylor.50 Reagan’s use of the Taylor story to 
illustrate welfare abuse effectively substituted the average welfare recipi-
ent with this extreme case of criminal intent and became a domestic policy 
talking point.51  
Reagan adopted welfare reform early into his political career, prom-
ising in the 1966 California gubernatorial race to send “the welfare bums 
back to work.”52 The timing of Reagan’s rise to political prominence, 
  
 45. White, supra note 37, at 1966 n.20 (noting that 38.1% of families receiving AFDC were 
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 48. Id. 
 49. Josh Levin, The Welfare Queen, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:41 AM), 
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 50. Id. 
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 52. Andrew Glass, California Republicans Nominate Reagan for Governor, June 7, 1966, 
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along with the strategies of the neoconservative movement, fall comforta-
bly within the arc of response and backlash to the Civil Rights Act. Polit-
ical strategist Lee Atwater infamously laid bare Republican efforts to cap-
italize on post-civil rights, white resentment in a 1981 interview outlining 
his “Southern strategy.” In an epithet-laden explanation, then-White 
House staffer Atwater discussed how to apply racist policies for political 
gain by recasting and generalizing those issues in terms of economics:53 
You start out in 1954 by saying, “[N-word], [n-word], [n-word].” By 
1968 you can’t say “[n-word]”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say 
stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re 
getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all 
these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a by-
product of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to 
cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a 
hell of a lot more abstract than “[N-word], [n-word].”54   
By the mid-1990s, the dog-whistle strategy had taken hold, with some 
Americans reflecting on welfare reform policy in overtly racist terms. 
Journalist Jason DeParle recalled receiving reader mail in response to his 
coverage of the welfare reform debate with comments including: “Dear 
Sir: What does it take before the liberal social reformers realize that 2000 
years of civilziation [sic] has passed black people by,” and “I as a middle 
class white person is paying for their children because the bloods can’t 
keep it in their pants.”55 These comments demonstrate how white voters 
had come to understand and heed the call of the dog-whistle politics sur-
rounding welfare reform.  
By 1996, the rhetoric finally became policy when the Republican-
controlled House and Senate put forth PRWORA (the Welfare Act). The 
Welfare Act created state block grants, implemented work requirements, 
and established “time out” limits to the periods for which recipients could 
receive benefits—prompting significant cuts to federal welfare pro-
grams.56 President Bill Clinton, who had pledged as a presidential candi-
date to “end welfare as we know it,” signed PRWORA into law on August 
22, 1996.57 In the Rose Garden ceremony marking passage of the Act, Lil-
lie Harden, a Black, former recipient of welfare and mother of three, in-
troduced President Clinton and flanked him for the photo op in which he 
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signed PRWORA into law.58 Ms. Harden’s remarks relating her move 
from welfare to work, seemed to be a White House effort to invoke and 
reject the “welfare-queen” label of the Reagan years.59  
Yet, critics of the Act suggested that it played into racially coded and 
gendered stereotypes by emphasizing a family unit composed of two het-
erosexual married parents as key to economic security. Even without the 
profligate abuse invoked by the “welfare-queen” rhetoric of the 1980s, the 
scapegoating of Black single mothers clearly informed the legislation and 
the political legacy leading up to PRWORA’s passage.60 The Welfare 
Act’s place in history—and the rhetoric that ultimately propelled its suc-
cess—demonstrate how it represented a political and legislative response 
to the aspirations of the Civil Rights Act.  
B.  Nativism, PRWORA, and the “Anchor Baby” 
A backlash to immigration also accounts for the anti-immigrant atti-
tudes underlying federal legislation in the mid-1990s. Both PRWORA and 
IIRIRA formalized nativist anxieties following the rise of an increasingly 
diverse immigrant population.61 PRWORA disqualified even documented 
immigrants from a number of programs, and IIRIRA expanded the 
grounds of inadmissibility and removability that applied to them.62 IIRIRA 
accomplished these objectives, in part, by building on public charge inad-
missibility.63  
These limitations on immigrants’ rights came at a time when the im-
migrant population was climbing.64 In 1991, admissions for residence to 
the United States hit an all-time high, peaking at 1,826,595 new lawful 
permanent residents admitted.65 In addition to an increase in the number 
of immigrant arrivals, the demographics of the new residents changed 
markedly from previous decades. Of the total U.S. foreign-born popula-
tion, European immigration steadily declined from 74.5% in 1960 to 
15.8% in 2000.66 As the migration of white immigrants to the United States 
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 63. IIRIRA § 531. 
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dropped off, immigration from other regions of the world steadily grew.67 
In 1960, immigrants from the Americas (primarily Latin America) made 
up 19.1% of the total U.S. immigrant population with immigrants from 
Asia and Africa comprising 5% and 0.6%, respectively.68 By 1990, those 
percentages increased to 46.3% from the Americas, 25.2% from Asia, and 
1.8% from Africa. These changes in immigrant demographics would not 
have been possible without the 1965 INA.69  
The INA fundamentally changed immigration demographics in two 
ways. First, the INA altered the use of immigration quotas, encouraging 
immigration from a more diverse set of countries worldwide.70 Second, the 
altered quota system impacted migration from Mexico by: (1) limiting the 
numbers of Mexican nationals, by quota, who could join family in the 
United States to a number exceeded by the demand for visas, and (2) end-
ing the bracero program, which drew Mexican workers to the United 
States for seasonal work.71 Both of these changes fostered an increase in 
unauthorized immigration to the United States from Mexico.72 By the 
1990s, the unauthorized immigrant boom garnered national attention.73 
Estimates suggested an increase in the undocumented population from 3.5 
million in 1990 to 5.7 million in 1995.74 This data emphasizes three main, 
distinguishing characteristics of immigration to the United States in the 
latter part of the twentieth century: (1) a growing immigrant population 
from the preceding decades, both in terms of raw numbers and percentage 
of the population; (2) an increasingly non-white immigrant population; 
and (3) a growing undocumented population. All of these factors played 
into the political rhetoric surrounding national immigration and welfare 
debates of the time. 
As neoconservatives sought to malign public benefits recipients with 
“welfare-queen” rhetoric, a similar political language was developing to 
question the rights of the foreign-born. Tensions surrounding new arrivals, 
both documented and undocumented, led to increasingly stringent immi-
gration laws and a renewed targeting of low-income immigrant families. 
Once again, nativist sentiments fueled a revisiting of the public charge 
doctrine. This time, lawmakers expanded the regulatory scheme surround-
ing public charge inadmissibility and tacked on criminal penalties related 
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to welfare fraud.75 As with welfare reform, both Presidents Reagan and 
Clinton played an outsized role in passing laws that penalized immigrants. 
1. Historical Discrimination Behind Immigration-Status-Based 
Welfare Restrictions 
In the article Unauthorized Welfare: The Origins of Immigrant Status 
Restriction in American Social Policy, Cybelle Fox describes a federal 
government initially hesitant to restrict benefits based on immigration sta-
tus.76 Fox explains how New Deal-era social programs made no distinc-
tions between citizens and noncitizens, and that the current regime of sta-
tus-based restrictions began at the state level between the 1930s and 1970s, 
eventually working its way through to federal policy.77 In 1971, the Su-
preme Court ruled in Graham v. Richardson78 that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause protected noncitizens from alienage-based 
welfare restrictions.79 Many officials within the Nixon Administration in-
terpreted the case to entitle even undocumented immigrants to public ben-
efits and went so far as to circulate proposed regulations enshrining this 
view.80  
While these officials never implemented the proposed rule,81 the per-
missive nature of the policy falls within a familiar pattern of inclusion and 
tolerance when viewed within the larger immigration context. Recall, the 
foreign-born population in 1970 fell to a historical low—4.7% of the total 
U.S. population.82 European immigrants remained the dominant group of 
that time, accounting for nearly 60% of all immigrants.83 Fox describes 
how federal officials at the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW)—the federal agency then responsible for welfare—soon 
did an about-face on this policy and began to implement restrictions based 
on immigration status that would expand and continue to this day.84 These 
federal restrictions, beginning in the early 1970s, came at a time of grow-
ing “economic malaise and racial tension.”85 State efforts to limit immi-
grant welfare eligibility also informed the federal restrictions. Represent-
atives from some of the southwest border states expressed the most vocal 
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opposition to the proposed regulation to extend federal benefits regardless 
of status.86  
By 1970, Texas, with its “virulent history of anti-Mexican sentiment 
and institutionalized discrimination,” was the only state that limited Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid to U.S. citi-
zens.87 When the federal government weighed in with its regulation pro-
posing immigration status-blind benefit eligibility, representatives from 
Texas presented some of the staunchest opposition to the new rule.88 Texas 
Republican Congressman James M. Collins derided the proposal, com-
plaining that “[w]e are trying to develop a system of getting the Wetbacks 
under control and HEW has an incentive program of encouraging them to 
enter our country.”89  
Meanwhile in California, five years before invoking the “welfare-
queen” bogey, then-Governor Ronald Reagan approved the California 
Welfare Act of 1971. This law prevented “the granting of aid to illegal 
aliens and temporary foreign visitors.”90 Discriminatory sentiment also an-
imated support for the California legislation. Before the passage of the 
California Welfare Act, one California columnist opined that, “California 
has long been known as a land of milk and honey. Its reputation is well 
known in Mexico, where to wetbacks … the word is out: ‘Go to California, 
where welfare workers hand out free food, free money and free medical-
dental care just for the asking.’”91 
As these few states vocalized their strong opposition to the federal 
rule, and experimented with their own state-level restrictions, the federal 
government soon followed suit. In 1973, HEW officials scrapped the pro-
posed status-blind eligibility rule and mandated restriction of welfare ben-
efits to “a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or 
otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law” 
(PRUCOL)92 This new PRUCOL doctrine officially disqualified undocu-
mented immigrants and remained in place until Congress passed 
PRWORA.93  
This debate around benefit eligibility and immigration status devel-
oped within a decade of the passage of the INA. The debate demonstrates 
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how the backlash to greater immigrant inclusion began to materialize 
through increasing restrictions to welfare benefits. Policymakers and pun-
dits used overtly racist language to justify restrictions with scant evidence 
that they were necessary. Indeed, many of these states came to find that 
administering status-based restrictions was cost prohibitive.  
While many states created some alienage-based restrictions to New 
Deal federal programs in the 1930s, within a decade many jurisdictions 
had already eliminated these requirements.94 States generally viewed these 
restrictions as too costly.95 States that eliminated these status-based eligi-
bility grounds also happened to be places where the majority of immigrant 
groups were of European origin.96 Even in states where the immigrant pop-
ulation was majority Mexican, the cost of administering status-restricted 
benefits became a burden. In 1975, San Diego officials remarked that ver-
ifying immigration status “hardly justifie[d] the expenditure” after review-
ing nearly 6,000 welfare cases and finding only ten undocumented immi-
grants on welfare.97 Given the great cost of status verification versus the 
exceeding rarity of ineligible noncitizens’ use of benefits, it appears that 
bias informed these policies of restriction. Overtly racist rhetoric from 
those in the states applying these restrictions all but confirms this conclu-
sion.98  
In the decades that followed, the status restrictions established in the 
1970s became the springboard for increasingly expansive limitations on 
immigrant benefit eligibility. While the PRUCOL standard initially only 
disqualified unauthorized immigrants, subsequent legislation imposed fur-
ther restrictions on lawful immigrants’ access to welfare. The Food Stamp 
Act of 1977 disqualified new, permanent residents from receiving means-
tested benefits by “deeming” their immigration sponsors’ incomes as their 
own.99 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 legalized nearly 
three million unauthorized immigrants100 but prohibited most of these law-
ful temporary residents from federal welfare programs.101 The Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 created TPS for nationals of countries plagued by natural 
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disaster or armed conflict102 but excluded them from welfare receipt by 
denying TPS holders the PRUCOL designation.103  
Scholars have noted how immigrants’ relative lack of political power, 
particularly the political vulnerability of the undocumented, contributed to 
the erosion of benefits in the last decades of the twentieth century.104 These 
authors have also suggested racial antipathy played a role in that lack of 
political will, especially as these efforts sought to disadvantage Latino im-
migrants.  
In 1995, before PRWORA’s passage, Kevin Johnson suggested that 
the efforts at immigrant benefit restriction were largely symbolic of grow-
ing ethnocentrism.105 Referencing the general absence of evidence of 
widespread benefit abuse (including data that immigrant use of public ben-
efits roughly mirrors that of the native-born), Johnson suggested race and 
ethnicity are the primary political motivators behind these policies.106 In 
support of this argument, Johnson offered the case study of California’s 
Proposition 187.107 Touted by proponents as the “Save Our State” or SOS 
initiative, the 1994 proposition promised to target unauthorized immi-
grants’ use of public benefits and improve coordination with federal im-
migration enforcement.108 The most problematic section of Proposition 
187 established an immigration status requirement for children’s use of 
state-funded public education.109 An independent analysis, provided to 
California voters in advance of the vote on the initiative, warned voters of 
the likely unconstitutionality of the proposal; the analysis explained, “The 
U.S. Supreme Court has determined (in the case of Plyler v. Doe110) that 
excluding children who are illegal immigrants from public schools vio-
lates the federal constitution.”111 In addition to conflicting with constitu-
tional law, the analysis explained how Proposition 187 had the potential 
to violate the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) 
by requiring California schools to report children to immigration authori-
ties without their parents’ consent.112 Though the measure passed with 
nearly 59% of the vote, litigation on the constitutionality of the initiative 
immediately enjoined California officials from instituting its provisions.113  
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While the questionable, legal validity of Proposition 187 did not dis-
suade voters from approving the measure, concerns about more practical 
considerations also failed to sway support. The nonpartisan California 
Legislative Analyst estimated that taxpayers could expect to save $200 
million annually.114 Yet, the associated costs of the measure (including 
status verification across local agencies and loss of federal funding result-
ing from lack of compliance with federal law) would likely amount to sev-
eral billion dollars.115 The electorate’s willingness to vote against its own 
economic interest and rhetoric that condemned illegal immigrants116 sug-
gested a biased motive in the passage of Proposition 187.  
Previous authors have exposed the racial dynamics of Proposition 
187 as a backlash to the increasing diversity in California and the United 
States.117 Few have compared the ways in which these nativist biases con-
spired to fundamentally change the nation’s welfare system leading up to 
PRWORA. While the California proposal remained tied up in court, con-
gressional legislators were working toward the construction of a bill that 
would ultimately disqualify many legally present immigrants from receipt 
of benefits. The experience of California was instructive, and federal ef-
forts at welfare reform and immigrant eligibility trace their roots to the 
earlier popularity of Proposition 187.118 California’s experiment paved the 
way for federal restrictions by suggesting that immigrants used more ben-
efits than governments could sustain and blurring the distinctions between 
undocumented immigrants and legal immigrants.119 California also con-
tinued the legacy of the failed Texas legislation at issue in Plyler by tar-
geting the children of immigrants.120 These efforts would conspire to even-
tually call into question the legitimacy not only of these children’s entitle-
ment to social programs but also to their acceptance for full citizenship. 
During this time, the efforts of legislators in Sacramento and Wash-
ington, D.C. reflected a larger, race-conscious trend toward restrictions to 
social welfare programs in the Western world that corresponded with the 
increase in non-European immigration.121 But, unlike their state counter-
parts, federal lawmakers were able to point to an existing legal doctrine to 
“dress up” their racially-motivated legislation. The century-old public 
charge exclusion provided a convenient vehicle for justifying increased 
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restrictions on immigrant use of antipoverty programs. The concept of 
public charge also served to mask some of the biased motivations targeting 
immigrant use of welfare that critics so roundly denounced in the contem-
poraneous debate around Black families’ access to benefits.  
Since then, racial and nativist sentiments against immigrants contin-
ued to build. No symbol has come to represent the hostility toward immi-
grants’ perceived use of benefits more than the “anchor baby.” While the 
public charge exclusion became the legislative pretext for racist re-
strictions on immigrant benefits, the image of the “anchor baby” has be-
come the rhetorical device of choice for changes to welfare policy as it 
affects immigrants.   
2. The Policies and Politics of the “Anchor Baby” 
By the 1980s and '90s, efforts to restrict immigrant use of public ben-
efits began to focus on the children of immigrants. States, like Texas in 
Plyler122 and California with Proposition 187, passed legislation to restrict 
enrollment of undocumented children. Despite its then-limited role in ad-
ministering public education, the federal government also restricted fed-
eral financial aid based on immigration status.123 Alienage restrictions of 
federal benefits to PRUCOL immigrants applied equally to children (doc-
umented and undocumented) and adults—restricting undocumented chil-
dren from receiving these means-tested benefits as well.  
Yet, as unauthorized immigration and the number of non-European 
immigrants climbed, nativist sentiments began to flare against a new tar-
get—the U.S.-citizen children of immigrants. 
Like many of the efforts to disfavor immigrants’ use of benefits, at-
tempts to disqualify their U.S.-born children moved from the state to fed-
eral levels. In California, Governor Pete Wilson attempted to implement 
provisions of Proposition 187 by issuing an executive order directing that 
prenatal services to undocumented women “be discontinued as soon as le-
gally possible.”124 Indeed, one of the most indignant points of the Propo-
sition 187 proponents’ arguments indicts the California State Legislature 
for “vot[ing] to continue free pre-natal care for ILLEGAL ALIENS!125 
These excitable statements seemed to ignore that access to prenatal care is 
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20 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1 
vital not only to the health of women but also critical to healthy develop-
ment of children.126 Voters’ willingness to support legislation that would 
harm these soon-to-be American citizens revealed a troubling hostility to-
wards the U.S.-born children of immigrants. 
After years of anti-welfare rhetoric, the election of a Republican con-
gressional majority in 1994 finally made welfare reform possible. While 
the earlier scapegoating of Black families again contributed to reformers’ 
calls for change, antagonism toward immigrants also informed the debate. 
Lynn Fujiwara explains how “[t]his majority rode in on a hostile anti-im-
migrant campaign that blamed liberal immigration policies for the visible 
influx of foreigners charged with burdening the American people through 
social costs.”127 Even as welfare reform remained a top priority, congres-
sional Republicans soon set their sights on immigration law. The 104th 
Congress drafted several bills designed to penalize immigrants and tighten 
immigration restrictions.128  
The most successful of these was IIRIRA, which passed into law on 
September 30, 1996.129 In addition to its increased emphasis on immigra-
tion enforcement, the law complemented the welfare restriction in 
PRWORA by expanding the public charge grounds of exclusion and de-
portation (which under IIRIRA became “inadmissibility” for what in prior 
law was termed “exclusion” and “removal” for what was formerly “depor-
tation”).130 In describing the interplay of 1996’s welfare and immigration 
reforms, congressional historians explain how “the welfare legislation set 
new, more restrictive standards of eligibility, whereas the immigration bill 
provided the enforcement mechanisms for those standards.”131  
The anti-immigrant sentiment behind these legislative successes is 
perhaps most stark when viewed against other immigration proposals of 
the time. In 1991, twenty members of the 102nd Congress introduced H.R. 
3605, a bill to limit birthright citizenship to children born to “legal resident 
mothers.”132 While this effort never made it out of committee, support for 
anti-immigrant federal legislation was gaining steam; three years later the 
  
 126. J. Rosenberg, Neonatal Death Risk: Effect of Prenatal Care is Most Evident After Term 
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https://www.guttmacher.org/journals/psrh/2002/09/neonatal-death-risk-effect-prenatal-care-most-ev-
ident-after-term-birth (finding a 40% increase in the risk of neonatal death for women in the United 
States who have not received prenatal care).  
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 128. See infra notes 133–34. 
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American people elected a Republican majority into the 104th Con-
gress.133 In 1995, members of the House of Representatives introduced 
H.R. 1363, the Citizenship Reform Act. The Citizenship Reform Act pro-
posed to restrict birthright citizenship to the children of U.S. citizens or 
lawful permanent residents.134 H.R. 2162, the Immigration Reduction Act 
of 1995, also proposed limiting automatic U.S. citizenship by birth while 
also reducing the number of immigrants who could be legally admitted 
into the United States.135  
These initial efforts demonstrate some of the anti-immigrant attitudes 
of the congressional majority that passed welfare and immigration reform 
in the 104th Congress. They also reveal how immigration hardliners in-
creasingly turned their attention to denying benefits to the children of im-
migrants. In fact, many House lawmakers supported an amendment to the 
immigration reform bill that would have overturned Plyler’s promise of 
public education regardless of status.136 This provision narrowly avoided 
inclusion in the final bill following months of debate and under the threat 
of Bill Clinton’s presidential veto power.137 These measures coincided 
with an increase in unauthorized immigration,138 a peak in the overall num-
bers in admission of legal immigrants,139 and the ongoing trend towards 
increased non-European immigration.140 In characterizing these policies, 
immigration restrictionists, again, turned to metaphor to craft their politi-
cal rhetoric.  
3. Defining Birthright Citizenship and Who is “American” 
Birthright citizenship in the United States began with the common 
law application of jus soli, the conferring of citizenship rights based on 
birth within a designated territory.141 In the 1857 decision, Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,142 the Supreme Court infamously placed a limit on this concept. 
The Court concluded that enslaved peoples of African descent failed to 
meet the federal definition of citizens of the United States:  
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The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the 
plea in abatement [enslaved peoples of African descent] compose a 
portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sover-
eignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were 
not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitu-
tion, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which 
that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United 
States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subor-
dinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject 
to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who 
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.143  
It would take a Union victory in the Civil War, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868, to refute the highly racialized legal proposition that 
birth in the United States was insufficient for conferring U.S. citizenship 
on non-white peoples.144 In the years that followed, increasing nativist sen-
timent led not only to public charge exclusion145 but also to race-based 
exclusions typified in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.146 
In August 1895, twenty-two-year-old Wong Kim Ark returned to the 
United States after a business trip to his parents’ native China.147 U.S. im-
migration officials excluded him at entry, claiming that he was not a citi-
zen of the United States despite his long-time residence and birth in Cali-
fornia.148 In the resulting legal fight, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Wong 
Kim Ark’s U.S. citizenship. Applying the concept of jus soli, the Court 
held that: “The fourteenth amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental 
rule of citizenship by birth within the territory . . . includ[ing] the children 
born within the territory of the United States of all other persons, of what-
ever race or color, domiciled within the United States.”149  
In addition to articulating the Fourteenth Amendment’s racial non-
discrimination principle, the Court went on to confirm its equal application 
to children born in the United States regardless of their parents’ alienage: 
“[E]very citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is 
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within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the 
jurisdiction, of the United States.”150  
Wong Kim Ark established the legal precedent for the birthright citi-
zenship of children born to noncitizen parents.151 Then, as in the mid-
1990s, the Court decided Wong Kim Ark during a time of increasing nativ-
ist backlash to immigrant settlement. Challenges to the citizenship of chil-
dren born to noncitizen-parents gained momentum in the years following 
the 104th Congress’s initial proposition to strip citizenship from the chil-
dren of the undocumented. As the political right argued for limitations to 
birthright citizenship, the movement adopted a potent metaphor—the “an-
chor baby.”  
While the term had been used as early as the 1970s and 1980s to de-
scribe the U.S.-born children of Southeast Asian refugees, the figure of the 
“anchor baby” gained new currency in the later debate around illegal im-
migration. The moniker created a pithy shorthand to represent the issue 
conceptualized in lawmakers’ attempts to limit birthright citizenship by 
statute.152 Namely, the nativist fear that immigrant women (and especially 
those without lawful immigration status) are seeking to give birth in the 
United States to secure the privileges of U.S. citizenship for their children 
and themselves.153 To quote Republican Congressman Bob Ehrlich of 
Maryland in 1997: “We want to take away your motivation to come to this 
country pregnant and have your baby.”154  
C.  Birtherism, Executive Action on Immigration, and President Obama 
In the midst of the staggering anti-immigrant legislation of the mid-
1990s, the legislative effort to limit birthright citizenship captured little 
public attention. Restrictions in immigration law made it practically im-
possible for U.S.-citizen children to readily sponsor their undocumented 
parents for lawful permanent residence. IIRIRA’s unlawful presence 
grounds of inadmissibility barred those in the United States without au-
thorization from obtaining lawful permanent residence until they waited 
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outside of the country for three or ten years.155 This disqualified many un-
documented parents of U.S.-citizen children from pursuing legal status.  
Yet, the misconception persisted that U.S.-born children would easily 
pass immigration status to their parents. In subsequent years, legislators 
would revisit the proposed Birthright Citizenship Act, reintroducing it in 
2011 and again in 2017.156 By the 2000s, the rhetorical power of the “an-
chor baby” had begun to reach a prominence comparable to the effect cre-
ated in earlier domestic policy debates around the “welfare queen.” In 
2006, the term “anchor baby” gained new currency in the renewed debate 
around immigration reform.157 That year, the editor of the American Her-
itage Dictionary of the English Language received a flurry of differing 
opinions on whether the term should include a label indicating it to be 
offensive (ultimately, the American Heritage did acknowledge the offen-
sive connotation).158 A 2011 study also found a dramatic surge in the use 
of the term.159 The authors of the study focused on the news media and 
online sources; they found that “the term was used almost exclusively on 
extreme right-wing and anti-immigrant sites” in the early 2000s, but “by 
late in the decade it had appeared in almost all mainstream news out-
lets.”160 
As with previous trends of in-group responses to minority inclusion, 
the proliferation of the term followed a marked shift in demographics and 
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representations of people of color. By 2010, European immigration to the 
United States had dropped to 12.1% of all authorized immigration,161 and 
the undocumented population rose to an estimate of more than eleven mil-
lion individuals.162  
Notably, the popularity of the “anchor baby” archetype also coin-
cided with the election of the nation’s first Black president. The political 
backlash to Barack Obama’s presidency has largely been understood as a 
racist reaction to the achievement of an African American in securing the 
nation’s highest political office. Many of Obama’s opponents applied rhet-
oric filled with nativist and xenophobic elements—regularly questioning 
the President’s U.S. citizenship. This combination of race and nationality 
gave rise to the political conspiracy theory known as “birtherism.”  
Beginning with a 2004 suggestion by an Illinois political opponent 
that Obama was a secret Muslim, assertions that Obama was not born in 
the United States proliferated on the internet in the same way, and at the 
same time, as tirades against “anchor babies.”163 Obama’s background as 
the son of a Black, Kenyan father and a white, U.S.-citizen mother incited 
racists and nativists. They questioned Obama’s claim to the presidency 
and the validity of his American citizenship.  
Among the many political opponents to question Obama’s U.S. citi-
zenship, none rose to greater prominence than Donald Trump. Trump 
launched his national political presence in 2011 by publicly questioning 
Obama’s birthplace.164 In so doing, Trump sold a political product that the 
American electorate eagerly bought. A Gallup Poll from that time indi-
cated that only 38% of respondents believed the President was “definitely” 
born in the United States.165 Trump’s questioning of Obama’s citizenship 
propelled him in the Republican 2012 presidential field to as high as a 
second place showing.166 Though Trump did not pursue the presidency in 
that election cycle, his foray into the political field set the stage for his 
2016 run. It allowed him to experiment with the political rhetoric on citi-
zenship and immigration that he would later deploy to characterize his do-
mestic policy platform.  
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Trump’s rhetoric also resonated with a conservative backlash to 
Obama that ultimately led to a Republican victory in the 2010 congres-
sional elections. Early into their term, ninety Republican members of the 
newly formed 112th Congress joined to introduce H.R. 140 in early 
2011.167 Dubbed the Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, the proposal 
sought to limit U.S. citizenship by birth to children born to at least one 
parent who is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or active duty 
member of the military.168 Though this version of the Birthright Citizen-
ship Act enjoyed greater support than lawmakers’ earlier attempts of the 
1990s, it too failed to make it out of the House of Representatives.169 Still, 
its occurrence under the new Republican congressional leadership, and on 
the heels of widespread conspiracies questioning Obama’s nationality, 
demonstrates the reactive nature of this renewed anti-immigrant agenda.170 
These animosities intensified as the Obama Administration embarked 
upon policies of greater inclusion for certain undocumented immigrants. 
In 2012 the Obama Administration announced the DACA pro-
gram.171 While Obama’s aggressive immigration enforcement policy led 
to a record number of deportations, his use of deferred action to provide 
immigration relief to “dreamers” (undocumented youth with longtime res-
idence in the United States who had been enrolled in school or the military) 
drew intense criticism from immigration restrictionists.172 Despite this, 
DACA attracted support from a variety of policymakers and hundreds of 
thousands of eligible youth applied for protection (which included work 
authorization and deferral of deportation) through the program.  
Two years later, however, many immigration hardliners felt that the 
Obama Administration went too far. On November 20, 2014, Obama an-
nounced an executive action on immigration that would allow the parents 
of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents to qualify for protection 
similar to DACA recipients.173 This program, known as Deferred Action 
for Parents of Americans and Legal Permanent Residents (DAPA),174 for-
  
 167. Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Amanda Sakuma, GOP Candidates Rethinking Constitution to End Birthright Citizenship, 
MSNBC (Aug. 8, 2019, 11:20 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/gop-candidates-rethinking-con-
stitution-end-birthright-citizenship. 
 171. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, 
Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012) (on file with U.S. Dep’t Home-
land Sec.) (formally announcing the DACA program). 
 172. See Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-
some-illegal-immigrants.html (reporting on Congressman Steve King’s intent on suing the Obama 
Administration to stop implementation of the DACA program).  
 173. 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/2014-executive-actions-immigration (last updated Apr. 15, 2015).  
 174. See generally Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for 
Parents of American and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/daca (last updated July 24, 2018). 
2019] IMMIGRANT PUBLIC BENEFIT RESTRICTIONS 27 
malized the fears of many immigration restrictionists that the undocu-
mented would use their U.S.-born children to get a foothold into the United 
States.  
Twenty-six states sued the Obama Administration to enjoin the pro-
gram.175 The states, again, used the question of public benefits to argue 
that the program would cause them financial harm by requiring them to 
extend driver’s licenses and unemployment benefits to beneficiaries of ex-
ecutive action.176 The states won; on June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoining the 
implementation of DAPA.177 Government proposals to limit birthright cit-
izenship and litigation to deny protections to parents of U.S. children dur-
ing the Obama Administration created an atmosphere for stronger anti-
immigrant rhetoric. 
III.  PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EFFORTS TO LIMIT IMMIGRATION AND 
EXPAND PUBLIC CHARGE EXCLUSION 
The presidential campaign of Donald Trump conveyed the most 
overtly nativist and anti-immigrant tones in decades. When now-President 
Trump announced his run for the presidency he infamously honed in on 
the issue of immigration. He stoked fear of immigration and suggested that 
immigrants from Mexico were dangerous criminals: 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re 
not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that 
have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. 
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And 
some, I assume, are good people. But I speak to border guards and they 
tell us what we’re getting. And it only makes common sense. It only 
makes common sense. They’re sending us not the right people. It’s 
coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and 
Latin America, and it’s coming probably— probably— from the Mid-
dle East. But we don’t know. Because we have no protection and we 
have no competence, we don’t know what’s happening. And it’s got 
to stop and it’s got to stop fast.178 
With this get-tough rhetoric, commentators observed that Trump has 
moved racially coded politics from a dog whistle to a “megaphone”179 or 
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a “scream.”180 Indeed, Trump’s rhetoric against immigrants, especially im-
migrants of color, remains a defining characteristic of his campaign, pres-
idency, and ultimately his appeal to his supporters. In addition to charac-
terizing Mexican immigrants as drug dealers and rapists, Trump has used 
metaphor to suggest immigrants are viperous snakes.181 His views on race 
and immigration are clearly displayed in a reported exchange with law-
makers in which he suggested that immigration from “shithole countries” 
(reportedly regions in Central America and Africa) should be limited in 
favor of immigration from countries like Norway182 (whose population is 
of over 90% European origin).183 Trump even suggested that people of 
color are not citizens of the United States when he tweeted that four con-
gresswomen of color—all U.S. citizens, and three of whom were born in 
the United States—should “go back and help fix the totally broken and 
crime infested places from which they came.”184  
Trump’s rise occurred during a time when European immigration fell 
to a historic low. In 2016, immigrants born in Europe accounted for a mere 
10.9% of all immigrants in the United States.185 Immigrants also accounted 
for 13.5% of the total U.S. population—a substantial percentage, compa-
rable to the 13.3% immigrant population in the United States when the 
public charge exclusion first entered federal law in 1880.186  
While many conservatives have argued that they have no issue with 
legal immigration, the Trump Administration has a different perspective. 
In addition to Trump’s signature campaign promise to erect a wall at the 
U.S. southern border187 and enforce aggressive removal policies,188 the 
Trump Administration has overseen the dismantling of several immigra-
tion programs that permit immigrants to lawfully enter or remain in the 
United States. During his first week in office, President Trump issued an 
Executive Order banning nationals of several Muslim-majority countries 
regardless of their prior authorization for entry to the United States.189 The 
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Trump Administration ended both of the Obama-era deferred action pro-
grams;190 ended TPS for a number of countries;191 halted a program that 
recruited immigrants with vital skills into the U.S. military;192 and pro-
posed ending the current program of family-based193 and diversity immi-
gration.194  
In his campaign to limit authorized and unauthorized immigration 
alike, Trump found an important ally in his former Attorney General, Jeff 
Sessions. Sessions’s support of Trump’s immigration agenda included se-
lective criminal prosecution of asylum seekers,195 separation of children 
from parents at the border,196 and the creation of legal precedent to limit 
claims for asylum from Central Americans fleeing gang-based and domes-
tic violence.197 Prior to assuming the office of the attorney general, Ses-
sions served as Senator for Alabama and an advisor to the Trump cam-
paign.198 In an interview from his time on the campaign, Sessions pointed 
to the INA as the catalyst in creating an immigration surge.199 In response 
to this boom, Sessions advocated for significant restrictions on immigra-
tion.200 He suggested that the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act—which banned im-
migration across racial lines—was a useful legislative model.201  
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Then-Senator Sessions also questioned birthright citizenship years 
before joining the Trump campaign.202 During a 2010 debate on whether 
to hold Senate hearings on the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship 
clause, Sessions said, “People do not believe you should be able to break 
into America, have a baby and then the baby becomes a citizen, and the 
whole family says, ‘We can’t go home. My child is a citizen.’”203 Prior to 
Trump’s election, Trump also raised questions around the issue of birth-
right citizenship. However, his rhetoric went even further than his former 
attorney general’s. Trump embraced the “anchor baby” term by refusing 
to back down from its use during the presidential campaign.204 And, while 
Sessions questioned the wisdom of jus soli, Trump questioned the validity 
of that citizenship all together: “I don’t think they have American citizen-
ship and if you speak to some very, very good lawyers—and I know some 
will disagree—but many of them agree with me and you’re going to find 
they do not have American citizenship.”205  
Trump later revisited his controversial view of birthright citizenship 
once in office. Despite a chorus of opposition from legal scholars, Trump 
suggested in 2018 that he could end the right to U.S. citizenship “just with 
an executive order.”206 By examining both men’s past statements on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a stunning conclusion emerges. While Sessions 
believes that children born in the United States to unauthorized immigrants 
should not be citizens, Trump believes they are not American citizens.  
Knowing this context is key to understanding how the Trump Admin-
istration is seeking to change the rules on public charge. The Administra-
tion is deploying all measures available to turn back the clock on the racial 
diversity fostered by the INA and the symbolic inclusion of the Obama 
era. Through a number of programs, policies, executive actions, and ra-
cially charged, nativist rhetoric, the Administration has targeted immi-
grants and programs that support them.  
Given similar past trends in American politics, it should come as no 
surprise that soon after Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, the Trump 
Administration leaked the proposed Executive Order on “Protecting Tax-
payer Resources by Ensuring Our Immigration Laws Promote Accounta-
bility and Responsibility.”207 As previewed in the introduction to this Ar-
ticle, the Order directed federal agencies to further restrict benefits to im-
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migrants by redefining guidance on public charge inadmissibility and de-
portability.208 Among the directives were proposals to expand the defini-
tion of a federal means-tested benefit for purposes of public charge deter-
mination and to rescind field guidance established for immigration adju-
dicators after the enactment of PRWORA and IIRIRA.209  
While the Order was never officially adopted by the President, sub-
sequent leaks confirmed that Administration officials were on their way to 
satisfying the Order’s objectives. In early 2018, journalists obtained the 
leaked drafts of the proposed DHS regulations’ outlining new rules on 
public charge.210 While the new rules did not impose an outright ban use 
of certain benefits, as Proposition 187 and PRWORA did, they sought to 
multiply the number of considerations that may lead to a public charge 
determination of inadmissibility or removal.211 The rule in the leaked draft 
would consider “whether any dependent family members for whom the 
alien provides financial support, including a U.S. citizen child, in the al-
ien’s household have received or are receiving public benefits.”212 This 
approach would have contradicted the 1999 INS Field Guidance on public 
charge, which addresses only the benefit use of the individual seeking ad-
mission or being charged with removability.213  
The draft rule also expanded the benefits to be weighed in making a 
public charge determination. Because the benefits usage of immigrants’ 
U.S.-citizen children were considered under the leaked draft, a number of 
programs for which immigrants themselves may not be eligible would be 
considered. This included programs such as Medicaid, Children’s Health 
Insurance Programs, and Head Start.214 The draft policy also named sub-
sidized healthcare and tax credits towards coverage under the Affordable 
Care Act as factors to be weighed in the public charge determination.215 
By expanding the ways in which authorized and unauthorized immigrants 
could violate the public charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportabil-
ity, the draft policy would have affected nearly 27 million people’s use of 
public benefits.216 Of this staggering number, over 9 million would be 
U.S.-citizen children.217 
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CONCLUSION 
While the DHS draft policies garnered media coverage that was 
somewhat muted in comparison to other Administration immigration pol-
icies, the leaks did serve to mobilize opposition.218 Coalitions of activists 
sought to challenge the efforts to expand public charge inadmissibility by 
garnering support from advocacy groups nationwide.219 These pressure 
tactics paid off.  
When the government formally released its proposed rule for notice 
and comment on October 10, 2018, some of the provisions most closely 
directed at benefits received by children had disappeared.220 Yet, in the 
call for public comment to the proposed rule, the Government specifically 
requested comments on including benefits under the Children’s Health In-
surance Program (CHIP) in the public charge determination.221 Indeed, 
even without a more direct penalty to parents for their children’s benefit 
use, the consequences anticipated by the government as recounted in the 
proposed rule include: 
• Worse health outcomes, including increased prevalence of 
obesity and malnutrition, especially for pregnant or breastfeed-
ing women, infants, or children, and reduced prescription adher-
ence; 
• Increased use of emergency rooms and emergent care as a 
method of primary health care due to delayed treatment;  
• Increased prevalence of communicable diseases, including 
among members of the U.S.-citizen population who are not vac-
cinated;  
• Increases in uncompensated care in which a treatment or ser-
vice is not paid for by an insurer or patient; and  
• Increased rates of poverty and housing instability; and  
• Reduced productivity and educational attainment.222  
To avert these dire consequences, a coalition of medical providers 
and activist groups committed to racial, social, and economic justice have 
campaigned against the proposed rule.223 This broad coalition of over 300 
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organizations reflects diverse interest groups that have experienced gov-
ernment attacks on public benefits as examples of systemic racism. DHS 
received hundreds of thousands of public comments in response to its no-
tice of proposed rulemaking on public charge inadmissibility.224 When 
DHS promulgated the final rule in August of 2019, dozens of litigants, 
representing states, localities, and private organizations and individuals, 
sued to enjoin the scheduled implementation of the rule.225 In at least three 
of these challenges, the plaintiffs have claimed that the new public charge 
rule is a racially discriminatory violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.226 While the courts hearing these chal-
lenges declined to rule on the merit of the equal protection claims, they did 
ultimately find that the new rule likely violated the Administrative Proce-
dures Act—the plaintiffs’ primary cause of action.227 Still, that the plain-
tiffs in these cases advanced this novel claim based on discrimination 
against non-white immigrants is remarkable. It is particularly historic that 
California—the state made infamous by Proposition 187—was one of the 
litigants to advance the equal protection litigation strategy along with other 
localities and a number of healthcare and legal services providers.228     
These new political alliances represent a sense of shared purpose 
among minority groups and immigrants that seemed impossible in the 
1990s when the debate on welfare reform largely ignored the interests of 
noncitizens. It is also stunning to see many states—the laboratories of dis-
crimination where many anti-immigrant public benefits policies fist orig-
inated—join in the effort to curb the expansion of the public charge rule. 
Today, an understanding of intersectionality and the predictable conse-
quences of conservative political attacks on communities of color have 
equipped advocates to work across interest groups and join forces to chal-
lenge these anti-immigrant proposals. By understanding tired political at-
tacks on “welfare queens,” activists are poised to disrupt and subvert anti-
immigrant political rhetoric on “anchor babies.” In their efforts, activists 
must understand public charge exclusion as a discriminatory, racially mo-
tivated policy. Current policymakers’ overtly biased rhetoric also make 
expansions to public charge more vulnerable to legal challenge. The com-
bination of these legal tools in the hands of a diverse group of stakeholders 
makes this expansion of the public charge rule less likely to succeed than 
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in earlier iterations. Understanding this history shows not only that there 
is a moral imperative to prevent its expansion but also that activists must 
partner to use law and policy to end the public charge rule and return it to 
the nineteenth century from which it came. 
 
Figure 1.229 Chart comparing immigration flows to changes in public 
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